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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY JEAN WARREN and
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 890365-CA
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, UNISYS AND NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO.,

(Argument Priority No. 6)

Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
UNISYS AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Industrial Commission correctly concluded,

as a factual matter, that substantial evidence supports the
conclusions that:

(A) the circumstances of this case did not

justify a contingent fee; (B) $1,000 is a reasonable attorney's
fee for the services rendered; and (C) any amount withheld in
excess of $1,000 should be paid over to Respondents?
II.

Whether this Court should assume the correctness of the

Judgment below based upon Appellants1 complete failure to:

(1)

reference the Record on Appeal to support its factual contentions; and (2) timely raise its contentions before the Industrial
Commission?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CASE AUTHORITY
The determinative case authority is Lanier v. Pvne, 29 Utah
2d 249, 508 P.2d 38 (1973).

See Addendum "A."

The determinative

statutory provision is Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62.

See Addendum

"B."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Betty Jean Warren ("Warren'1) and

Goicoechea Law Office ("Goicoechea") (referred to collectively as
"Appellants") sought Industrial Commission approval of attorneys'
fees arising out of a contingent fee contract allegedly entered
between Goicoechea and Warren's husband for the purpose of
recovering damages in a third party claim brought on behalf of
Warren for industrial injuries she sustained in an automobile
accident.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Industrial
Commission.
1.

On August 21, 1987, Warren, through her counsel,

Goicoechea Law Office, petitioned the Industrial Commission of
Utah for approval of attorneys' fees, relative to obtaining
insurance policy limits in a third party claim for which the
liability insurance carrier never denied liability.

(R. at 4-6

and 56-59.)
2.

At a hearing conducted by Administrative Law Judge

Richard G. Sumsion on October 19, 1987, the respective parties
presented arguments concerning the reasonableness of the

attorneys' fee claimed by Appellants.

(R. at 12-13.)

(See also

Transcript of Industrial Commission Hearing at p. 33:1-6.)
3.

On October 29, 1987, Judge Sumsion entered his "Order

Approving Attorneys Fees," which contains the following factual
determinations:
(a) Goicoechea had only expended five hours of time in
obtaining the third party settlement for which liability was
accepted by both the auto liability carrier and the Worker's
Compensation carrier (R. at 14);
(b) The worker's compensation carrier never denied
liability and the actions on the part of Crawford Risk
Management1 and its attorneys in investigating the third
party claim and determining whether or not to accept liability were conducted in a sufficiently expeditious manner as
to not justify the imposition of a contingent fee in this
case (R. at 15);
(c) An attorney's fee of $1,000 was found to be
reasonable and was properly approved (Id. ); and
(d) The amount withheld [by Appellants] in excess of
$1,000 should be paid over to Crawford Risk Management.
(R. at 14-15. )
4.

On November 12, 1987, Appellants moved for Review of

Judge Sumsion's Order.

(R. at 17-19.)

Respondents also moved

for review, asserting that an attorney's fee in the amount of
$1,000 was excessive in this case.

x

(R. at 23-24.)

Crawford Risk Management Co. was the adjuster for
Defendant/Respondent National Union Fire Insurance Company.
Because Crawford could not verify an acceptance of liability on
Warren's industrial claim, the matter was referred to counsel for
National Union Fire Insurance Company, who determined that
liability would be accepted. National Union notified appellants
of its determination within one month of Warren's industrial
accident and approximately three weeks after Goicoechea became
involved. (R. at 56-57.)

5.

The matter was set for a hearing with an unprecedented

full Industrial Commission in attendance on September 22, 1988.
(R. at 58.)
6.

On May 12, 1989, the Commission entered its Order

Denying Motions For Review, affirming the Administrative Law
Judge's factual determinations that:

(1) $1,000 is a reasonable

attorney's fee; and (2) Goicoechea "should turn over all but
$1,000 of the Third Party Settlement to Crawford & Company
(National Union Fire Insurance Co.).
7.

(R. at 59.)

On June 8, 1989, Appellants filed their Petition for

Review of the Commission's Final Order, thus obtaining review by
this court.
C.

(R. at 63-65.)

Statement of Facts:
The Statement of Facts contained in Appellants' brief fails

to either reference or accurately characterize the proceedings
below.

Therefore, respondents offer the following facts to

properly present and clarify the Record.
1.

On June 2, 1987, Warren was jogging during her lunch

hour when she was struck from behind by a car.

(R. at 1-3, and

56.)
2.

Due to Warren's state of incapacitation following the

accident, her husband proceeded to seek legal assistance on her
behalf and contacted Ronald E. Dalby ("Dalby") of Goicoechea Law
Offices on either June 6, 1987, or June 7, 1987.
3.

(R. at 56.)

On or about June 8, 1987, Warren's husband allegedly

entered a contractual agreement with Goicoechea, in which
-4-

Goicoechea agreed to provide legal representation for Warren in
her pursuit of insurance benefits from the auto liability carrier
for the driver that struck Warren,
4.

id.

The legal representation agreement allegedly specified

that Goicoechea would be entitled to 33 1/3% of any recovery on
the third party claim.
5.

(R. at 56-57.)

During June, 1987, Dalby contacted both Farmer's

Insurance, the third party auto liability insurance carrier, and
Crawford & Company, the adjuster for National Union Fire
Insurance Company, the worker's compensation insurance carrier
for Warren's employer, Unisys.
6.

(R. at 56-57.)

Although Crawford & Company could not verify an accep-

tance of liability for worker's compensation benefits when Dalby
first called, due to some question regarding whether or not
Warren was injured in the course of her employment, the attorney
for National Union did determine that liability would be accepted
for the worker's compensation benefits, and promptly notified
Goicoechea of this determination on July 2, 1987.
7.

(R. at 57.)

Within two weeks of Dalby's initial contact with

Farmer's Insurance Company, Farmer's agreed to turn over the
policy limits to Goicoechea on behalf of Warren, in the amount of
$25,000.
8.

(R. at 57.)
Goicoechea then directed that the third party settle-

ment ($25,000.00), less a 33 1/3% attorney's fee ($8,333.33),
should be sent to Crawford & Company.

Id.

9.

Mr. Dalby acknowledged that he and his office expended

only five hours in obtaining the third party recovery on behalf
of Warren.
10.

(Hearing Tr. at pp. 34-35.)

There was no discussion nor negotiation between

Goicoechea and Crawford & Company regarding how the proceeds of
the third party settlement were to be distributed.
11.

(R. at 57.)

Based upon Goicoechea1s failure to negotiate a reason-

able distribution of the third party settlement with respondents,
Crawford noted that they could withhold payment of worker's
compensation benefits until a suitable distribution had been
agreed upon.

However, no benefits have been withheld pending

resolution of the issue of what attorney's fees should be charged
to respondents by Goicoechea.
12.

(R. at 38-39 and 57.)

Goicoechea filed a Petition for Approval of the contin-

gent Attorney's Fees with the Industrial Commission on September
14, 1987.
13.

(R. at 57.)
After Judge Sumsion approved an attorney's fee of

$1,000.00 (R. at 13-16), the entire Industrial Commission,
consisting of Commissioner Steve Hadley, Chairman and
Commissioners John Florez and Thomas Carlson heard appellants'
arguments on their Motion For Review on September 22, 1988.
(Transcript of Industrial Commission Hearing at p. 4.)
14.

After fully considering the arguments of counsel and

reviewing the applicable case authorities, the Commission made
the following factual determination:
The Commission agrees with the Administrative Law
Judge that $1,000.00 is a "reasonable' attorney fee for
-6-

the assistance Dalby provided to the applicant. Per
the Administrative Law Judge's findings, anything more
would be unreasonable considering the time and effort
Dalby asserted. Therefore, Dalby should turn over all
but $1,000.00 of the Third-Party settlement to Crawford
& Company/National Union Fire Insurance.
(R. at 58.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission that it
was not reasonable to impose a contingent fee contract upon the
worker's compensation carrier in the instant case and that, under
the circumstances presented, $1,000 is a reasonable attorney's
fee, this Court may properly give maximum deference to the
Commission's final Order.

This is especially true where, as

here, Appellants fail to provide any factual support for their
contentions on appeal and otherwise rely upon inapplicable
contentions raised for the first time on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS SHOULD
NOT BE DISPLACED.
A

-

Substantial Evidence Supports the Decisions of the
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission Which
Should Be Affirmed Pursuant to the Appropriate Standard of
Review.
The Utah Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard of

review for Industrial Commission cases in Blaine v. Industrial
Commission. 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1985),

concluding that

,f

the Commission's findings are not to be displaced in the absence

of a showing that they are arbitrary and capricious."

The Court

clarified this standard of review in Rushton v. Gelco Express,
732 P.2d at 109 (Utah 1986), explaining that the findings and
orders of the Commission are not arbitrary and capricious unless
"they are contrary to the evidence or without any reasonable
basis in the evidence."
In Blaine, the Utah Supreme Court referred to the prior
case

of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah

1982), in order to outline the Appellate Court's function in
reviewing Industrial Commission findings:
[I]t is apparent that this Court's function in
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly
limited one in which the question is not whether the
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious," or
"wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence," or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced.
(Citations omitted.)
Kaiser Steel, 732 P.2d at 890.

See also Lancaster v. Gilbert

Development, 736 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, this Court "give[s] maximum deference to the
basic facts determined by the agency, which will be sustained if
there is evidence of any substance that can be reasonably
regarded as supporting the determination made."

Wilson v.

Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah App. 198 7)
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(citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d SOSSOS (Utah 1987)).
In the instant case, substantial evidence supports the
factual conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge and Commission
that no more than $1,000 is a reasonable attorney fee for the
services rendered on behalf of Warren by Goicoechea Law Offices.
Indeed, Mr. Dalby admitted that he had worked only five hours in
obtaining the third party settlement on the claim in which liability was admitted.

(Hearing Tr. at pp. 34-35.)

In addition, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission clearly concluded that the actions of Unisys and
National Union and its attorneys in investigating this claim and
determining whether or not to accept liability "were conducted in
a sufficiently expeditious manner as to not justify the imposition of a contingent fee in this case."

(R. at 15 and 58.)

Thus, it was not "reasonable" for Goicoechea Law Offices to
expect to recover one-third of the total amount obtained in the
third party settlement.

Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

S 35-1-62, Respondents should not be obligated to pay a proportionate share of an attorney's fee which is not "reasonable."
(R. at 58.)
The decision of Lanier v. Pvne, 29 Utah 2d 249, 508 P.2d 38
(1973) squarely addresses the issue raised in the instant case.
In Lanier, the court declared that the worker's compensation
insurance carrier, which recovers a portion of the third party
settlement obtained by the applicant's counsel, must participate

in a proportionate share of the applicant's attorney's fees.
However, the court states a significant qualification applicable
to the section 35-1-62 obligation.

As referenced by the

Industrial Commission/ the Utah Supreme Court clearly declared
that:
It should be here restated, as was indicated in the Worthen
case, supra, that [the Worker's Compensation Carrier's]
obligation was only to pay its proportionate share of a
"reasonable" attorney's fee as determined by the court and
not necessarily an amount contracted for by the plaintiff.
(Emphasis added.)
Lanier, 508 P.2d at p. 40.
In applying the holding of Lanier in the instant case, the
Industrial Commission concluded that respondents need not pay a
share of the unreasonable attorney's fee allegedly contracted by
Warren's husband.

The Commission stated:

$1,000 is a "reasonable" attorney fee for the assistance
Dalby provided to the applicant. Per the Administrative Law
Judge's findings, anything more would be unreasonable
considering the time and effort Dalby asserted. Therefore,
Dalby should turn over all but $1,000 of the third party
settlement to Crawford & Company/National Union Fire
Insurance. (R. at 58.)
Based on this factual determination, the Industrial
Commission denied the Motions for Review and affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's Order of October 29, 1987. The Orders
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission are
clearly based upon the facts acknowledged by Mr. Dalby and
Goicoechea Law Offices in the hearing before Judge Sumsion and in
the hearing before the entire Industrial Commission.

The facts

unquestionably support the conclusion of the Administrative Law

-10-

Judge to the effect that a finding of attorney's fees must not be
based upon a contingent fee because liability was never contested.

The facts also support the commission finding that no

more than $1,000 is an appropriate attorney's fee to be charged
to the worker's compensation carrier in the instant case because
Goicoechea only spent five hours in obtaining the Settlement of
uncontested claims.
The conclusion of the Commission is also amply supported by
the following factual determinations:
(1)

Farmers Insurance, the insurer for the third party

tort feasor never denied liability for the accident.

In fact,

Farmers admitted liability when first contacted by both Crawford
& Company and Goicoechea.
(2)

(R. at 56-58.)

Crawford & Company never denied liability for

worker's compensation benefits; it simply indicated a need to
investigate and evaluate the claim, because of its complexity,
prior to making a determination of liability.
(3)

Id.

Warren's counsel, Goicoechea, rushed into negotia-

tion of a contingent fee contract with the applicant's husband
prior to ascertaining whether or not any claim asserted by the
applicant would be denied, so as to be subject to a contest
requiring the services of an attorney.

Id.

See also (Transcript

of Industrial Commission Hearing at pp. 12-13.)

Indeed, Warren

never participated in the hiring of Goicoechea since she was
unconscious and in the hospital during the relevant period of

-11-

time.

There is no evidence of record that Goicoechea ever did

enter into a contingent fee contract with Warren herself.
(4)

Id.

Goicoechea never did enter into a contingent fee

contract with the defendants/respondents relative to the defendants1 possible subrogation interest in connection with a third
party claim.

(R. at 56-58.)

(5)

The $5,000 in no-fault benefits were not "obtained

by Goicoechea"; liability therefore was never questioned and was
always payable.
(6)

(R. at 56-58.)
The record supports the determination of the

Administrative Law Judge and the Commission with respect to
reasonableness of attorneys fees in light of the fact that most
of the time spent by Goicoechea was in hastily making preliminary
inquiry of both Crawford & Company and Farmers concerning their
position on liability.

Pursuant to those inquiries, Goicoechea

was never informed of any denial of liability and was in fact
informed, within a reasonable time, that liability was being
accepted by both Farmers for third party benefits and by Crawford
& Company for worker's compensation benefits.

Id.

See also (R.

at 13-16) .
The facts as determined by the Administrative Law Judge and
the Commission more than adequately support the conclusion that
not more than five hours total time was spent by Goicoechea in
connection with this matter.
more than generous.

Such an estimate of time spent is

As asserted by Respondents in a separately

filed Motion for Review, the expenditure of a minimal time on the
-12-

part of Goicoechea does not even justify a determination of an
attorneys fee in the sum of $1,000. This is especially true in
light of the fact that when Goicoechea first contacted Crawford &
Company concerning this matter, it represented that it was
calling on behalf of Warren as "a favor" to her.

(R. at 26.)

Therefore, Respondents urge this court to give ''maximum
deference to the basic facts determined by the agency, which will
be sustained if there is evidence of any substance that can be
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made."
Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah App.
1987) (citing Allen & Associates v. Industrial Commission, 732
P.2d 508, 509 (Utah 1987)).

In the instant case, the Commission

and the Administrative Law Judge have both determined, as a
factual matter, that $1,000 is a reasonable attorney fee and that
any amount in excess of $1,000 obtained by Goicoechea should be
delivered to Respondents.

(R. at 56-59.)

Based on the substan-

tial evidence supporting these factual determinations, the
Commission's findings should not be displaced.
POINT II
APPELLANTS IMPROPERLY RAISED CONTENTIONS
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL AND ARE OTHERWISE UNSUPPORTED AND
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held
that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.

Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik v.

Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); and Inslev

Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347
(Utah 1986).

The record must clearly show that an issue was

"timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to
obtain a ruling thereon.
raised."

We cannot assume that it was properly

Franklin Financial v. Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d

1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).

If a party fails to present an issue to

the trial court, they will have waived the right to raise it on
appeal.
In the instant case, Appellants assert numerous legal
arguments and facts which are beyond the scope of the record.
For example, Goicoechea's arguments regarding waiver of rights
and interference with independent contracts were not raised
before the Commission and are inappropriately raised for the
first time on appeal.

Similarly, appellants argue that the

Commission erroneously interpreted the law and attempted to
abrogate contingent fees.

Despite an opportunity at the hearing

before the full Commission, Goicoechea failed to raise such
contentions.

In support of the newly raised contention, appel-

lants cite Prettvman v. Utah State Department of Finance, 27 Utah
2d 333, 496 P.2d 89 (1972).

However, Prettvman does not support

the argument asserted.
In Prettvman the Court noted that pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 35-1-62, a Worker's Compensation carrier should only "bear its
pro rata share of whatever attorney's fee was reasonable in
obtaining the settlement."

Prettvman, 496 P.2d at 91. Thus,

reasonableness is the determining factor.
-14-

The Prettvman decision

is distinguished from the instant case because (1) liability was
contested; (2) a cause of action was actually filed against the
third party; and (3) it took fourteen months to obtain a settlement.

In contrast, in the instant case, liability was admitted

and Goicoechea only expended five hours to obtain the settlement.
In the words of the Commission, anything more than $1,000.00
attorney's

fees would be "unreasonable" in this case.

(R. at

58.)
Likewise, Goicoecheafs suggested application of the decision
in Taylor v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 743 P.2d 1183, 1185
(Utah 1987) is inappropriate for several reasons.

First, Taylor

does not address the critical issue of determining a reasonable
attorney's fee.

Second, the Taylor decision does not in any way

nullify or depart from the Court's prior Lanier decision, requiring payment of a proportionate amount of a "reasonable attorney's
fee as determined by the court and not necessarily an amount
contracted for by the plaintiff."

Lanier, 508 P.2d at 90.

Third, in the instant case, the sole issue for discussion is
whether or not a contingent fee is reasonable under the circumstances of this case.

Finally, the contention of appellant's

regarding recovery of a contingent attorney's fee in this case
would be more likely to result in uncertainties and inequities,
especially if Goicoechea recovers one third of $25,000 for only
five hours of work.

The Commission has already determined that

such a recovery is "unreasonable."

(R. at 58.)

Appellants also mistakenly argue that the Industrial
Commission exceeded its authority in denying their Motion for
Review, or in the alternative that the Commission decision was
premature based on na failure to conduct a hearing."

Neverthe-

less, Mr. Dalby acknowledged before the entire Industrial
Commission that the Commission had full authority to render a
decision in response to his Motion for Review.
pp. 27, 29 and 30.)

(Hearing Tr. at

Importantly, it was in a "Hearing" that

Mr. Dalby made this acknowledgement.

Thus, the suggestion that

Review was premature is not only contradictory, but it is also so
transparently contrived as to warrant sanctions.

In addition,

any Objection to the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be
considered abandoned because Appellant failed to raise any
objection to Judge Sumsion's Order.

Thus, not only did the

unmodified Order approving $1,000.00 in attorney's fees have the
effect of denying Appellants1 unraised objections by necessary
implication, but the action of Appellants in acknowledging
appropriate commission review also indicates an intention to
abandon any suggested objections.

Appellants assertions of

impropriety in this regard lack both legal support and factual
merit.
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POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF
THE JUDGMENT BELOW.
A.

Appellants Failed To Refer To The Record To Factually
Support Their Contentions On Appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it will

assume the correctness of the judgment below where, as here, an
appellant does not support facts set forth in his or her Brief
with citations to the Record.

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613

(Utah 1987) and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah
1982).

In Trees, this court declared that it:

will assume the correctness of the judgment below where
counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements of
Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to
making a concise statement of facts and citation of the
pages in the record where they are supported. (Citations
omitted.)2
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief
referred to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no
citations to the Records.

Occasional references to the record

appeared in the Argument section of the Brief.

Trees, 738 P.2d

at 612, n.2.
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah
1982), the court concluded that:
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of the
trial court is that the defendant failed to refer to any
portion of the record that factually supports his contention
on appeal.
2

Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Court of Appeals, which became
effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced former Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the requirement
that citations to the record support the fact statement in the
briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3.
-1 7-

In the instant case, despite references to their own
Addendum, Appellants failed to refer to the Record to support any
factual contentions.
ly, this

(Appellants' Brief at pp.4-6).

According-

Court should assume the correctness of the judgment

below based on Appellants' failure to refer to any factual
support in the Record, and may affirm the judgment on this
independent basis.
Under these circumstances, Respondents respectfully urge
this Court to uphold the factual determinations of the Commission
which should be sustained because there is substantial evidence
supporting the determinations made.
CONCLUSION
The Record demonstrates that the overwhelming weight of
evidence supports the Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
the Final Order of the Commission on the essential issues in this
case.

It is unnecessary and contrary to the applicable standard

of review for this court to attempt to second-guess the judgment
of the Administrative Law Judge and the full Commission on the
factual issues which only involve the weight of the evidence
herein.

This is especially true where the weight of the evidence

clearly favors the determination made in favor of Respondents.
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that
this Court affirm the determination of the Industrial Commission,
denying Appellant's Petition for Review.
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DATED this 4th day of December, 1989.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^ar^yR. Laycock
Attorneys for Defendants Unisys
and National Union Fire
Insurance Co.
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Jerry K. LANIER, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Harold D. PYNE and Gibbons & Reed Compiny, a corporation, Defendants
and Respondents,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
Intervenor and Appellant.

its own attorneys who would protect carrier's interest did not relieve carrier of
duty to bear proportionate share of expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by injured workman following settlement of suit,
since workman should have basic control
of his action. U.C.AJ953, 35-1-62,. 35-162(2).

No. 12918.
3. Workmen's Compensation $=2251

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 23, 1073.
An appeal was taken hy subrogated
workmen's compensation carrier from a
judgment of the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., requiring compensation carrier to bear proportionate share of injured workman's attorneys' fees incurred in negligence action. The Supreme Court, Crockett. J.,
held that the fact that compensation carrier, which intervened in negligence action to protect its right of subrogation, notified injured workman and his attorneys that
carrier did not desire their representation
and had hired its own counsel did not entitle carrier to escape liability for its proportionate share of cost and attorneys' fees,
since workman should have basic control of
his action.
Affirmed.
Henriod, J., filed a dissenting opinion
in which Callister, C. J., concurred.
I. Workmen's Compensation €=>225l

Insurance carrier which has paid compensation has preference for reimbursement
for amount it has paid as compensation
from any recovery by injured workman in
negligence action and the injured workman
can have only the excess he is able to obtain. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-62, 35-1-62(2).
4. Workmen's Compensation C=>\\
Purpose of Workmen's Compensation
Act is to benefit injured employees and
not to impair or destroy natural rights
which exist by reason of the common law
to sue for redress of wrongful acts. U.CA.
1953, 35-3-1 et seq., 35-1-62; Const, art.
8, § 19.
5. Workmen's Compensation <S=>225I

District courts, upon proper application
and due consideration of facts shown in
light of its plenary powers in administering law and equity, can make such orders
as are necessary and expedient in order
to do justice between parties as the particular circumstances warrant with regard to
liability of workmen's compensation carrier to share proportionate costs and attorneys' fees incurred in tort action by injured workman. U.C.A.1953, 33-1-62, 351-62(2).

Purpose of amendment to provide for
full reimbursement of compensation carrier out of sum recovered in tort action by
injured workman less proportionate share
of costs and attorneys' fees is to have insurance carrier, whose rights should be reRichard H. Moffat, Moffat, Welling,
garded as secondary to plaintiffs interests, Taylor & Paulsen, Salt Lake City, for inbear its proportion of these expenses in- tervenor and appellant.
stead of having them come entirely out of
Gayle Dean Hunt, Dwight L. King, Salt
injured workman's share of settlement.
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-62, 35-1-62(2).
CROCKETT, Justice:
2. Workmen's Compensation $=2251
Fact that carrier which by reason of
Plaintiff, Jerry K. Lanier, while driving
its right of subrogation intervened in in- a yellow cab was injured in a collision with
jured workman's tort action notified in- a truck belonging to Gibbons & Reed Conjured workman and his attorneys that it struction Company. For his injury and
did not desire their representation and that disability he was paid workmen's compen-
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sation totaling $3,301.22 by Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company. Meanwhile, the plaintiff had employed his own attorneys on a
one-third contingent fee basis to sue Gibbons & Rccd for about $100,000 for negligently causing him injuries and damage,
as perm itted by Section 35-1-62, U.CA.
1953.
During the pendency of the action, Liberty Mutual, through its attorneys, intervened, asserting its right to subrogation to
plaintiff's claim against Gibbons & Reed.
Prior to trial the suit was settled for the
sum of S14,000.
[1] It is not questioned that Liberty
Mutual was entitled to reimbursement for
the $3,30122 it had paid to the plaintiff.
The controversy is over whether it must
bear its proportionate share of the fees
paid to the plaintiff's attorneys. Heretofore there was concededly some uncertainty in our statute. Sec. 35-1-62, as it formerly read:

tionate share of costs and attorneys'
fees provided for in subsection (J).2
[Emphasis added.]
The addition of the emphasized language
to the statute seems plainly intended to
eliminate the previously existing uncertainty and to make it clear that "the person
liable for compensation payments [Liberty
Mutual] shall be reimbursed in full for
all payments made less the proportionate
share of costs and attorneys' fees", so that
the insurance carrier will bear its proportion of these expenses, instead of having
them come entirely out of the plaintiff's
share of the settlement.

{2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in
full for all payments made.
In the case of VVorthen v. Shurtleff and
Andrews, Inc.,1 and other cases we have
held that the plaintiff and the subrogated
insurance carrier should each bear its proportionate share of the costs and the attorney's fees incurred in obtaining the recovery. The legislature has since amended
paragraph (2) of Sec. 35-1-62, U.C.A.1953,
so that it now provides:

[2] However, by indulging in a process
of rationalization, and by following a procedure presently to be stated, Liberty Mutual contends that notwithstanding the
amendment, it is still not obliged to bear
any portion of plaintiff's attorney's fees.
This contention is based on the following
propositions: that by reason of its right
of subrogation, it properly intervened in
the action; that inasmuch as it would be
required to pay attorney's fees, it should
be privileged to choose its own attorneys;
that it notified the plaintiff and his attorneys that it did not desire their representation; and that its own attorneys would
protect its interests. Liberty Mutual does
not disagree with the cases above referred
to, but asserts that this one is different because in none of them does it appear that
the plaintiff was put on notice, as he was
here, that the insurance carrier had hired
its own counsel and would protect its own
interest. It thus raises what it asserts to
be the sole issue in this case: that when
it has thus hired its own counsel and given
such notice, it is not required to participate
in proportional payment of the costs and
attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff.

(2) The person liable for compensation
payments shall be reimbursed in full
for all payments made less the propor-

The answer to this argument of Liberty
Mutual is that its effect would be to allow
the insurer, by the simple expedient of de-

If any recovery is obtained
against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the
action, including attorneys' fees, shall
be paid and charged proportionately
against the parties as their interests
may appear.

I. 39 Utah 2d 80, 420 P.2d 223 (19G7) ;
Graham r. Industrial Commission. 26
Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d 223 (1971);
Pmtyman v. Utah State Department of
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Finasce, 27 Utah 2d 333. 496 P-2d 80
(1972).
2. Laws of Utah 1971, Cb. 76, Sec 3.
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daring in advance that it would not abide
by the statute, to defeat the plainly stated
legislative intent that the insurer's reimbursement should be " . . . less the proportionate share of costs and attorneys'
fees
. " incurred in the action.
This certainly was intended to apply to the
attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff.
The trial court correctly so ruled and required Liberty Mutual to participate in its
proportional share of the costs and attorney's fees the plaintiff had incurred in obtaining the settlement, which assured the
reimbursement for Liberty Mutual. It
should be here restated, as was indicated
in the Worthen case, supra, that Liberty
Mutual's obligation was only to pay its proportionate share of a "reasonable" attorney's fee as determined by the court, and
not necessarily an amount contracted for
by the plaintiff.
We are not insensitive to the possibility
of problems which could arise as suggested
by the arguments of Liberty Mutual: e. g.,
where the injured workman does not
promptly bring his action; or where the
carrier has made extensive investigation,
which is made available to the plaintiff;
and/or where its subrogation is obviously
to the larger proportion of the claim against
a third party; and/or where there is a basis
for genuine concern as tc the inadequacy
of counsel chosen by the plaintiff. With
respect thereto we make the following observations: The first and controlling one
in this case is that the trial court did not
find them to exist here. It is plainly apparent from the possibility of having to
bear part of plaintiff's attorney's icts. The
trial court found that the action was initiated and the settlement obtained solely
through the efforts of the plaintiff and his
attorneys. This reinforces the justification for the trial court's conclusion that
the requirement of the statute quoted above
(Sec. 35-1-62, Subsection (2), as amended), must be met by reimbursement of Liberty Mutual for the payments it had made
'less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys* fees" incurred by plaintiff in

obtaining the settlement. We could there
write "sufficient unto the day is the evil
thereof", consider the matter finished, and
let other problems abide until presented in
genuine controversy.
[3] However, counsel have assured us
of their concern with possible difficulties
in other such cases. With respect thereto,
and also as bearing upon the decision we
have arrived at in this case, we offer
these further comments: Considerations of
reason and policy impel the conclusion that
the plaintiff, the one who has suffered
the injury' and damage, should have basic
ownership and control of his cause of action. It is most natural to suppose that
he will try to obtain the maximum possible
recovery. But the insurance carrier has
first preference for reimbursement for the
amount it has paid as compensation, and
the plaintiff can have only any excess that
he is able to obtain. This is true notwithstanding the fact that said Section 62 states
that when the carrier pays compensation it
shall become "[the] trustee of the cause of
action." It is the trustee for the plaintiff,
the true beneficiary and owner thereof.
The interest of the carrier extends only to
the amount of compensation it has paid;
and its only real interest is to obtain its
full reimbursement. Except for any altruistic motive it may or may not have for
the plaintiff, it has no incentive to obtain
further recovery for him.
[4] It is because of the policy considerations just stated, and the sequence of
the grant in the statute, that we think it
reasonable to conclude that the rights conferred upon the insurance carrier should
be regarded as secondary to the plaintiff's
interest, and so conferred as a safeguard
to the carrier and to thus afford it a means
of protecting its interest in case the injured
employee does not do so. But this prerogative granted the insurance carrier should
not be deemed to diminish or adversely affect the right of the injured employee to
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proceed against the third party.3 This is
in accord with the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which is to benefit injured employees and not to impair or
destroy natural rights which exist by reason of the common law to sue for the redress of wrongful acts.4
[5] With respect to all of these matters
it is further pertinent to note that the
district court, which has jurisdiction of
<uch actions, upon proper application, and
due consideration of the facts shown, in
li^ht of its plenary powers in administering
law and equity,5 can make such orders as
are necessary and expedient in order to do
justice between the parties as the particular
circumstances warrant.6
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff as against
intervenor Libenv Mutual Insurance Company.
ELLETT and TUCKETT, J]., concur.
HEXRIOD, Justice (dissenting):
Respectfully I dissent. This case and the
Worthen case, and the others cited in the
main opinion, in my opinion, flout the purpose of workmen's compensation. They
allow an attorney's fee to get an award
from the Industrial Commission—at taxpayers' expense, and I think another attorney's fee of 33i/ifJ to sue a third party,
and then another 3 3 ^ or 509c for whatever
5S collected from the insurance company
by virtue of a statute that flies in the teeth
of the purpose and intent of the Workmen's
Compensation statute: that of paying compensation, from statutory funds, intended
for compensation of the worker's family
budget.
The majority opinion blushingly should
admit to the rendering of obeisance and
comfort to someone other than the person
for whom the statute should be, and for
whom it was passed.
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HEXRIOD, J.
3. See Rosnlaki v. Phillips Petroleum Co..
3 Utah 2d 203, 2S2 P.2d 304 (1955).
4- Larson, Workmen's Compensation Low.
Vol. 2, Set*. 71:10-75:40.
508 P.2d—3Va
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Retpondent,
v.
Eugene MYERS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12738.

Supremo Court of Utah.
March 27, 1073.

The Third District Court of Salt Lake
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., found defendant guilty of forgery, a noncapital felony
offense, and he appealed. The Supreme
Court, Ellctt. J., held that defendant waived
his right to be present in court where, after the trial had begun, the defendant asked
for and was granted a continuance in order
for an out-of-state witness to appear and
testify, but where, on the morning the trial
was to resume, neither the witness nor the
defendant, who had been at liberty on bail
and who intentionally absconded as soon
as he was granted the continuance, could
be found.
Judgment affirmed.
Crockett, J., concurred specially with
opinion.
1. Criminal Law €=>636(l)
A trial involving a charge of felony
cannot be commenced in the absence of
defendant in view of statute providing "If
the prosecution is for a felony, the defendant must be personally present at the trial."
U.C.A.1953, 77-27-3.
2. Criminal Law €=636(1)
Every defendant has the right to be
present in court at all stages of the trial,
but it is not absolutely necessary for a defendant who was at large upon bail or
recognizance charged with a noncapital offense to be personally present in court
during all of the proceedings at his trial;
it is a right which may be waived under
certain circumstances.
U.CA.1953, 7727-3.
5. Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Set-. 19.
6. See diicuwion in Man son v. Nelson. 289
Minn. 99, 182 N.W\2d TOO (1970).
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A certificate from the duly authorized officer of the
industrial commission or similar department of another state certifying that the employer of such other
state is insured therein and has provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working
within this state shall be prima facie evidence that
such employer carries such compensation insurance.
1SS3

35-1*56. Compliance with act — Notice to employees.
Each employer providing insurance, or electing directly to pay compensation to his injured, or the dependents of his killed employees, as herein provided,
shall post in conspicuous places about his place of
business typewritten or printed notices stating, that
he has complied with the provisions of this title and
all the rules and regulations of the commission made
in pursuance thereof, and if such is the case, that he
has been authorized by the commission directly to
compensate such employees or dependents; and the
same, when so posted, shall constitute sufficient notice to his employees of the fact that he has complied
with the law as to securing compensation to his employees and their dependents.
wn
35-1-57. Noncompliance — Penalty.
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal
injuries arising out of or in the course of employment
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents or
employees, and also to the dependents or personal
representatives of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such action the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following
defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the
defense of assumption of risk, or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of
the employer and the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting in
such injury. And such employers shall also be subject
to the provisions of the two sections next succeeding
[Sections 35-1-58,35-1-59]. In any civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fees assessed against the employer.
IMS

35-1*58. Rights of employees where employer
fails to comply.
Any employee, whose employer has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46, who has
been injured by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted,
or his dependents in case death has ensued, may, in
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action
in the courts as provided in the last preceding section
(Section 35-1-57], file his application with the commission for compensation in accordance with the
terms of this title, and the commission shall hear and
determine such application for compensation as in
other cases; and the amount of compensation which
the commission may ascertain and determine to be
due to such injured employee, or his dependents in
case death has ensued, shall be paid by such employer
to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after

35-1-62

receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fixed and
determined by the commission.
law
35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court —Enforcing judgment
An abstract of any award may be Hied in the office
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of
the district court thereof. The time of the receipt of
the abstract must be noted by him thereon and entered in the docket. When so filed and docketed the
award shall constitute a lien from the time of such
docketing upon the real property of the employer situated in the county, for a period of eight years from
the date of the award unless previously satisfied. Execution may be issued thereon within the same time
and in the same manner and with the same effect as
if said award were a judgment of the district court.
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the
time of the injury, the county attorney for the county
in which the applicant or the employer resides, depending on the district in which the final award is
docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested
by the industrial commission. Where the action to
enforce a judgment is initiated by other counsel, reasonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be allowed in addition to the award.
ltrs
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or
officer, agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted.
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common
law or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin,
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident
or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the
course of or because of or arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent or
employee of the employer based upon any accident,
injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended.
tsss
35-1-61. Repealed.

mi

35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful
acts of persons other than employer,
officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention
to proceed against third party — Right
to maintain action not involving employee-employer relationship — Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
When any injury or death for which compensatior
is payable under this title shall have been caused b;
the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than a'
employer, officer, agent, or employee of said en
ployer, the injured employee, or in case of death h
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dependents, may claim compensation and the injured
employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also have an action for damages against such third
person. U compensation is claimed and the employer
or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action against the third
party and may bring and maintain the action either
in its own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal representative of
the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may
not settle and release the cause of action without the
consent of the commission. Before proceeding against
the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or other person obligated for the
compensation payments, in order to give such person
a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in
the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with
the injured or deceased employee at the time of his
injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the
employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had
against the third party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs
and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for
compensation.
1975
35-1-63. J u d g m e n t s in favor of commission —
Preference.
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by
the commission or by the state under the authority of
this title shall have the same preference against the
assets of the employer as claims for taxes.
ltu
35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three
days after injury unless disability extended.
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three
days after the injury is received, except the disbursements hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse and
hospital services, and for medicines and funeral expenses, provided, however, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more than fourteen days, compensation shall also be payable for the first three
days after the injury is received.
ISTS
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of
payments — State average weekly
wage defined.
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee
shall receive 66-v3rr of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such
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disability is total, but not more than a maximum of
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a IPPXJT""™ of four such dependent children, not to
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
period of eight years from the date of the injury.
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of
recovery, and when no such light duty employment it
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid.
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of
each year, the total wages reported on contribution
reports to the department of employment security under the commission for the preceding calendar year
shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding year by
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used
as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom.
1S61

35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability —
Amount of payments.
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compensation equal to:
(a) 662/3% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the accident and the weekly wages the employee is able
to earn after the accident, but not more than
100% of the state average weekly wage at the
time of injury, plus
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a
maximum of four such dependent children, but
only up to a total weekly compensation that does
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of injury.
(2) The commission may make an sward for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior to
eight years after the date of the injury to an employee:
(a) whose physical condition resulting from
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight
years after the date of injury; and
(b) who files an application for hearing under
Section 35-1-99.
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies.
isss

35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of
payments.
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
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